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SELF-INCRIMINATION: FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
APPLIED TO PROSPECTIVE ACTS
Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968)
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court of Connecticut
of conspiracy to evade payment of the federal gambler's occupational tax
and of wilful failure to register and pay the tax., Petitioner's motion to
arrest Judgment, alleging inter alia that the statutes requiring registration and
payment of the tax violated his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination,2 was denied, 3 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed 4 on the authority of United States v. Kahriger5 and Lewis v. United
States.6 On certiorari the United States Supreme Court HELD, that inasmuch
as the hazards of self-incrimination resulting from compliance with the
statutory provisions were "substantial and real," asserting of the privilege
constituted a complete defense to prosecution for noncompliance. Judgment
reversed, Justices Brennan and Stewart concurring separately, Chief Justice
Warren dissenting, and Justice Marshall not participating. 7
The common law privilege "to remain silent unless [one] chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will"8 when an inquiry elicits an
acknowledgment of one's wrongdoings originated in the seventeenth century
ecclesiastical courts of England to counter the use of the ex officio oath
demanded of offending priests. 9 Although some of the classic justifications
for the existence of their privilege are of questionable validity in contemporary society, 1° the privilege has become "a powerful symbol of individual
1.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ §4411,

4412.

2. U. S. CONST., amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
3. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968).
4. Costello v. United States, 325 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'd sub. nom. Marchetti v.
United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). Both Marchetti and Costello were convicted of identical
offenses arising out of the same series of events. The Court originally granted certiorari to
Costello and upon his death granted it to Marchetti, 385 U.S. 1000.
5. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
6. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
7. Mr. Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision because he had been involved in the case prior to his appointment to the Court.
8. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964).
9. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
10. Id., §2251, at 310-17. Professor McNaughton lists twelve separate theories that
have been proposed to justify use of the privilege: (1) it avoids burdening the courts with
false testimony; (2) its use protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself through
a poor performance on the witness stand; (3) the privilege encourages third party witnesses
to testify by removing their fear of self-incrimination; (4) it is a reflection of the government's recognition that it cannot compel truthful testimony; (5) it prevents use of the
infamous procedures employed by the Star Chamber; (6) its use is justified by its long survival over several centuries of criticism; (7) it preserves the dignity of the legal system; (8)
it encourages the prosecution to do a thorough and independent job of investigating the
case; (9) it aids in the frustration of "bad" laws and "bad" procedures, especially those in
the area of political and religious beliefs; (10) it protects the individual from prosecution
for crimes of insufficient notoriety or seriousness to be of public concern; (11) it prevents
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liberty,"" and an indication of the "law's unwillingness to command the
impossible [coupled with] its respect for the law of self-preservation."' 2 By
the later decades of the eighteenth century, the privilege had attained sufficient status to be incorporated into the Bill of Rights as a basic tenet of
the Anglo-American adversary system of criminal prosecution. 13 The Supreme
Court's decision in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson' 4 in 1894

applying the privilege to testimony in administrative hearings initiated an
expansion of the applicability of the privilege that assured the private citizen
that governmental pressure could not, with a steadily decreasing number of
exceptions, be employed to make criminal a failure to admit one's criminal
acts.
While the Court has continued to rule that certain evidentiary matters
are not within the realm of protection afforded by the privilege, such compulsion of potentially incriminatory testimony is offset by an equally effective
protection such as immunity from prosecution replacing the privilege,' 5 or the
expedition of obtaining the information is incident to an overriding public
interest not related to the criminal process.' 6 There were, however, two
areas in which substantial hazards of self-incrimination did exist and which
logically fell within neither valid immunty exception nor the required
records doctrine: testimony, which although not incriminating within the
forum jursdiction, might incriminate the witness under the laws of another
sovereign having jurisdiction over the witness," and compulsory registration
torture and other inhumane treatment; and (12) it contributes to a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the state to leave an individual alone until it has good cause to
disturb him.
Professor McNaughton feels that the latter four theories are the heart of the privilege's
survival and continued vitality.

11.

Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act and the Privilege Against Self-

Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 687 (1951).

12. Id. at 692.
13.

U. S. CoNsr., amend. V. "The shift [towards a more liberal interpretation of the

Fifth Amendment] reflects the recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution
is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its mainstay."
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
14. 154 U.S. 447 (1894). The expansion initiated by Brimson has been fairly consistent:
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1966) (applied to registration of
members of the Communist Party); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (before legislative committees); McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1925) (testimony in civil cases); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906) (testimony before a grand jury).
15. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (immunity granted by the
forum jurisdiction is binding on other jurisdictions). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964).
16. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The necessary prerequisites for
applying the "required records" doctrine are reiterated by the Court in Marchetti: (1)the
purpose of the government's inquiry must be regulatory; (2) the information must be
contained within records that the party customarily keeps, and (3) the records themselves
must have some public aspects rendering them somewhat analogous to public documents.
Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697, 707 (1968).

17. Dionisopoulos, New Dimensions to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
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of persons engaged in practices "inherently suspect of criminal activity."',,
The first of these incongruities - the "two sovereignties doctrine"1 9 - was
eliminated in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan20 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.1 These decisions assured a witness that he could invoke the privilege
in either a state or federal procedure when faced with incrimination in the
other jurisdiction.
The compulsory registration statutes, which frequently forced an individual to "confess himself into a state prison" 22 or face federal prosecution,
were the second contradiction to the fundamental application and operation
of the privilege. Such statutes are of two basic designs: those that require
registration to facilitate the payment of an occupational tax (usually coupled

with an excise tax) ,'23 and those that are incorporated into the federal penal
code and aimed at persons engaged in activities of a criminal or highly suspect
4
nature.2
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the gambler's
occupational tax in United States v. Kahriger25 in 1953. The majority of the
Court held that the registration requirements did not violate Kahriger's
privilege against self-incrimination because the declarations required by the
registration form were entirely prospective and the privilege applied only to
past or present acts that would tend to incriminate. Two years later the
26
Court again considered the validity of the statutes in Lewis v. United States
and strengthened its previous position by noting that registration and payment of the tax were a condition precedent to engaging in gambling activity
as far as the federal government was concerned and therefore could not constitute a declaration of present illegal activity.
In 1965 the Court was called upon to consider the validity of an order
of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring registration of certain
members of the Communist Party in accordance with section eight of the
Subversive Activities Control Act.?7 A unanimous Court, in finding the order
to be inconsistent with the protection of the fifth amendment, recognized
the "obvious ...risks of incrimination, which the petitioners take in registering" 28 in view of the sanctions imposed upon active members of the Communist Party by the Smith Act. 29 Initially, one would be inclined to assume
Supreme Court and the Fifth Amendment, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1967).
18. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
19. Dionisopoulos, supra note 17, at 3.
20. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
21. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
22. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
23. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§4721, 4722 (narcotics), 4751, 4753 (marijuana), 5179, 5101 (stills)
(INT. REv. CODE OF 1954), See infra note 43.

24. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §1407 (registration of narcotic addicts entering or leaving the
country), §2424 (requiring registration of all aliens entering the country for purposes of
prostitution).
25. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
26. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
27. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, title 1, §3, 64 Stat. 995 (repealed 1968).
28. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77 (1965).
29. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1964).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 9
1968]

CASE COMMENTS

that the holding of Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board30 would
make the validity of the wagering tax provisions a foregone conclusion.3 '
However, although the decision in. Albertson was ostensibly reached on a fifth
' 2
amendment basis, the registration provisions in question "clashed head-on"
with the first amendment right of free political association as well.33 Indeed,
Chief Justice Warren argued in his dissenting opinion in the present case
that Albertson could be distinguished on this basis even thought the Court
3 4
had not reached the petitioner's first amendment contentions in Albertson.
The majority of the instant case noted that the "linchpin [of Kahriger
and Lewis] is plainly the premise that the privilege is entirely inapplicable
to prospective acts." 85 In overruling both Kahriger and Lewis and applying

the privilege to prospective acts in which "the confession of a guilty purpose
precedes the act which it is subsequently employed to evidence," 36 the Court
extended the privilege to an area in which "history . . . offers no ready
illustration of [its] application."3 Certainly the most immediate impact of
the instant case will be to render ineffective registration statutes similar to
those involved in the instant case.38 The impact of this policy limiting governmental authority to compel registration of those suspected of criminal
activity is clearly indicated by the present case and two decisions handed down
at the same time: Grosso v. United States39 and Haynes v. United States.40

Grosso dealt with an excise tax on gambling4- and Haynes concerned the
registration requirements of the National Firearms Act. 42 Both decisions
applied reasoning similar to that in the instant case to strike down the opera-

tion of the statutes involved.43

80. 882 U.S. 70 (1965).
31. Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 CoLUM.
L. R.v. 681 (1965); Comment, Self-incrimination and Registration Statutes: a Case Against
Constitutionality, 4 HoustON L. Rxv. 507 (1966).
82. Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697, 720 (Warren, C. J. dissenting).
33. See Note, A Re-examination of the Fifth Amendment as Applied to Federal Registration of Gamblers: United States v. Costello, 14 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 947, 950 & n.22 (1967).
34. 88 S. Ct. 697, at 720 & n.5 (1968).
85. Id. at 705.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. But see United States v. Richardson, 284 F. Supp. 419 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (registration
of stills permitted because congressional purpose was to facilitate collection of taxes that do
not apply only to those engaged in criminal activity). Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
dissenting opinion in Marchetti contains an extensive listing of similar statutes, 88 S. Ct. at
821-22 &n.7, at 722 (1968).
39. 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968).
40. 88 S. Ct. 722 (1968).
41. INr. RLv. CoDE of 1954, §4401.
42. INT. RL. CoDE of 1954, §5841.
43. Post Marchetti developments include Rainwater v. Florida, 88 S. Ct. 900 (1968),
vacating mem. 186 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1966); Lee v. Kansas City, 88 S. Ct. 901 (1968), vacating
mem, 414 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. 1967). Rainwater and Lee were only two of several memorandum
decisions handed down by the Court applying the Marchetti principle. See 88 S. Ct. 697732 (1968). The Court has granted certiorari to a Fifth Circuit case challenging the constitutionality of the marijuana tax, Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 2053 (1968). Sizemore v. United States, 393 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1963)
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The decision in the instant case applying the protection of the privilege
to the registration requirements of the wagering tax coupled with the holdings in Haynes and Grosso restores the operation of the privilege to a somewhat more rationally allied realm of situations than had existed during the
interim after Albertson when Kahriger and Lewis were still controlling. But
as has been the situation with several previous decisions, the application of
constitutional protections to those who are unquestionably guilty of some
criminal conduct appears to be so hostile to the public welfare that invariably
criticism results. The Court's critics fail to balance the need to incarcerate
known criminals
with the necessity of adhering to the mandates of the
"4
Constitution. 4

Had the Court affirmed Marchetti's conviction, the impact of the compulsory registration statute involved in this case would still have been
confined to persons guilty of violating some state or federal law related to
gambling other than the registration statutes. 45 Such a decision would have
allowed the government to compel registration in almost any area simply
by creating a sham tax and requiring those taxed to complete comprehensive
registration forms before payment. 46 The present decision reinforced the
accusatorial basis of the American system of criminal prosecution as recog47
nized by the federal district court in Kahriger v. United States:
While the desire to curb the underworld activities is a wholesome
tribute to our fundamental aspirations, if the fundamental principles
claimed by the federal government in this particular case were given
the highest Judicial approval, future acts of Government in a field
not so free from improper motives, would enable the Central Government to regulate our lives from the cradle to the g ave. The remedy
would be worse than the disease.
The Court's extension of the privilege to prospective acts presents some
issues of interest. On the facts of the present case, extension of the doctrine
to prospective acts was not necessary in order for the Court to find the
(registration of firearms) was based on Holmes v. United States, 390 U.S. 35 (1968), which
followed Marchetti. See also United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Ohio 1968),

cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1968) (No. 366); United States v. McGee, 282
F. Supp. 550 (D.C. Tenn. 1968); Silbert v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 635 (D.C. Md. 1968);
United States v. Riccio, 282 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Commonwealth v. Katz, 240 A.2d
809 (Pa. 1968).

44. 114 CONG. REC. 87,6029 (daily ed. May 21, 1968) (remarks of Senator McIntyre).
45. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§1952, 1953, 1084, 1301-04; CONN. GN. STAT. REV. §53-295 (1958);
FLA. STAT. §849 (1967).
46. The Court considered the possible invalidity of the tax on gamblers as an abuse of
the federal government's taxing power in Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), and
found that Congress had not improperly exercised its power in creating the gambling taxes.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter strongly disagreed with this aspect of the Lewis
decision. Id. at 423. Although the Marchetti holding is based solely on fifth amendment
grounds, the case does effectively curtail congressional attempts to enforce both state and federal criminal statutes through use of its taxing power. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). See generally R. Baker, Taxation -Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 CHL-KENT L. REV. 197 (1951).
47. 105 F. Supp. 322, 324 (D.C. Pa. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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privilege to be a defense to accusations of noncompliance. The registration
form in question contained two questions- that clearly required an answer
indicative of present gambling activity. This alone could have been sufficient
basis for a reversal in the instant case. But even if the Court had elected to
ignore this aspect of the appeal, it could have reversed on the theory that
registration provided either a "link in the chain of evidence" 49 or a lead for
an investigation that could ultimately result in conviction.50 The Court did in
fact recognize the existence of these factors and did acknowledge them to be
sufficient basis for reversal, 51 but it then chose the prospective nature of the
52
inquiry as the foundation of its decision.
The opinion in the instant case is rather elusive regarding both the
criteria for a prospective declaration and the application of this new standard
to cases not factually similar but dealing with a declaration of intent as
opposed to present activity. Since the prospective application of the privilege
has virtually no precedent, the Court's next pronouncements in this area
should be more definitive or it could well discover that the "insubstantial
claims of the privilege," 53 which it expects future litigants with sufficient
"temerity [to] pursue" 54 actually are claims instigated by a legal profession
trapped in a semantic morass that only the Court can eliminate.
PHILIP

W.

DANN

48. Internal Revenue Form 11-C (rev. March 1958). Questions five and six are, respectively: "Are you engaged in the business of accepting wagers on your own account?"
and "Do you receive wagers on behalf of some other person or persons?" The form was
revised in 1963 (Internal Revenue Form 11-C, rev. July 1963) and both of the above
mentioned questions now read: "Are you or will you be ...." (emphasis added). However,
question five still requires that the applicant list "the number of employees and/or agents
engaged in receiving wagers on your behalf." Consequently, regardless of the form used,
the applicant still must declare that he is presently engaged in gambling activity.
49. The metaphor is to be found in the opinions of both Lord Eldon in Paxton v.
Douglas, 19 Ves. Jr. 224, 227 (1812) and of Chief Justice Marshall in United States v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (1807).
50. See Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
371 (1962).
51. 88 S.Ct. 697, 703, 705 (1968).
52. 88 S.Ct. 697, 705-06 (1968).
53. 88 S.Ct. 697, 706 (1968),
54. Id.
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